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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
vs.
WILLIAM GIBSON McLAUGHLIN
and DENNIS BECKER,
Appellants.

Case No.
11305

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
William Gibson McLaughlin and Dennis Becker appeal
from a c'onviction of wilfully and maliciously breaking into
a coin box associated with a public telephone instrument in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-48-28 (Supp. 1967).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendants waived their right to trial by jury and
were tried and convicted of the above charges before the
Honorable C. Nelson Day, Judge of the Fifth Judicial District, on July 12, 1967. On July 31, 1967, Judge Day sentenced
the defendants to the Utah State Prison for a term not exceeding five (5) years, the term to commence on May 8, 1967.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirm<ttion of the lower court convictions.
STATEMENT OF FACT'S
On the morning of May 8, 1967, at 5 :30 a.m., Clinton A.
Nisson was awakened by a commotion outside his store
where he also resided in the town of Washington, Utah.
Arising from his bed, he observed from his bedroom window
two young men, one of whom was outside watching while
the other was in the public telephone 'booth in the process
of removing the telephone. Although it was still dark, there
wa:s adequate light from the phone booth and a large street
light nearby for Mr. Nisson to see tha't the one outside of
the booth was wearing a white shirt and that the one inside
working on the phone was wearing blue or dark trousers
and shirt (Tr. 58-59). There was a dark car with large round
taillights backed up to the booth but facing away from the
observer. After being certain about what was going on, Nisson phoned the State Highway Patrol during which time
the removal of the phone was completed, its captors
having fled from the scene with certain parts including the
coin box and the money therein.
Simultaneously with the phone call, however, the dispatcher at the patrol station about two miles away had alerted Officer Joseph A. Pfoutz of the St. George Police who
intercepted the car <is it entered the on-ramp to the freeway
about nine-tenths of a mile from Nisson's store. Responding
to the officer's flashing light, the car stopped on the freeway approximately one quarter of a mile towards Cedar City
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from the on-ramp and the two defendants in this case met
the officer at the rear of the car and asked what the trouble
was. Officer Pfoutz replied that he had received a report
of a phone being burglarized in Washington. To this defendant McLaughlin stated that he had been in the booth,
but only to look for a phone number of a friend of his aunts
(Tr.94). Defendants were held at the rear of the car, along
with two young women who were passengers, one of whom
was the car's owner, until aid requested by the officer arrived.
Mr. Nissan arrived within five minutes and identified
the tW'o defendants, McLaughlin and Becker, as well as the
car, as being those he had observed minutes earlier at the
phone booth near his store. The car was a dark 1964 Ford
convertible, equipped with large, round tail-lights, distinctive of that make and year. (Tr. 12)
Shortly thereafter, within fifteen minutes, Trooper Donald A. Best and Hyrum M. Ipson of the State Highway Patrol arrived as did Sergeant Blondie Porter of the St. George
Police Department. All four occupants were placed under
arrest and taken to the St. George City Jail where they were
warned of their constitutional rights, first by Officer Hyrum Ipson and later, when he arrived, by Evan Whitehead,
Sheriff of Washington County. (Tr. 24)
The car was guarded by Dall J. Winn of the State Fish
and Game Department until taken to the compound by City
Jail officials about an hour later. It was searched pursuant
to a warrant at about 11 :00 a.m. and revealed several items
including one cant hook, one telephone coin box, one telephone coin box housing, one coin bag and other tools which
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appeared to have been used in the removal of the phone.
This evidence was suppressed at the trial as having been
illegally obtained.
The reason for the s11ppression appears to have been
that there was an improper return on the search warrant in
addition to the fact that there was some testimony to the
effect that some of the items, namely the coin box, coins, the
coin box housing and a cloth under which they had been
hidden in the back seat of the impounded auto, had been
removed from the automobile anrl placed in the patrol car
while driving to the city jail one hour after the arrest. The
items were then placed back into the automobile to await
rhe search by warrant. This, counsel for the defendant argued was not incident to the arrest, was improper 'as being
without warrant, and vitiated any subsequent search by a
warrant, in addition to the fact that the warrant did not
have a proper return. Although several of the officers had
viewed the coin box and coin box housing under the cloth
in rhe rear se'at at the time of the arrest, the items were not
seized at tha:t time and the trial judge held that there had
been no search incident to an arrest.
Ten days later, on or about the morning of May 18, at
about 2 :00 a.m., Officer Pfoutz in the jail at St. George was
addressed by defendant Becker concerning some reading
material that he, Officer Pfoutz, had in his hands. When the
Officer replied that he was reading the complaint, the defendant requested that he read the complain't out loud. When
the part of the complaint which contained the words "wilfully and maliciously tampering with a coin box associated
with a public telephone" were read, defendant McLaughlin
exclaimed that they had not done it maliciously but had
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done it for the money. Defendant Becker, voicing no objection to this admission, remained si'lent. (Tr. 27)
At the time of trial the defendants waived their right
to trial by jury and presented no evidence on their own behalves. Following the trial the two young women were released on mo'tion of counsel for defendants. A motion to
release defendants McLaughlin and Becker was denied. The
defendants were sentenced by Judge Day on July 31, 1967,
to the Utah State Prison for a term not exceeding five years.
ARGUMENT
POlNT I
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE
PROCESS NOR OF ANY OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT A WITNESS AT THE TRIAL STATED INTO THE RECORD
THAT DEFENDANTS HAD ASKED FOR AN ATTORNEY AFTER BEING GIVEN A PREINTERROGATION
WARNING
In the course of the trial, after Officer Pfoutz had
testified that all of the defendants were present at the time
he overheard Sheriff Whitehead advise them of their rights
he was asked to relate what happened next. Having some
difficulty with expressing what went on, he was asked to
summarize what the defendants did or said, to which he
stated that they wanted an attorney. Defendants now charge
that this statement is being used as a negative inference of
their guilt in violation of their rights to receive a warning
or advice that they have a right to counsel under the Fifth
Amendment. Defendants also allege that this was admitted
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into evidence and considered by the Judge over the objection of counsel. Perhaps the best way to evaluate what
happened would be to look at the transcript (Tr.96-97).

Q. Were all of the defendants present at the time
you overheard Officer Whitehead advise them of
their rights?
A.

Yes, sir. I believe so, yes, sir.

Q.

What happened next?

A.

The two gentlemen indicated that they didn't-

MR. PICKETT: Just a minute. We object to any
indication or interpretation, any indications.

Q.

(By Mr. Burns) State what you did.

THE COURT: Mr. Witness, when you say they
indicated, why, that's your conclusion as to what
they did. You may state the substance of what they
said. No one will expect you to remember their exact
language at this time, unless it was taken down
electron;_cally or like the court reporter is doing
now; but you may state in substance what was said,
if you remember.
THE WITNESS: They said that-didn't say a heck
of a lot. They did want an attorney.
MR. PICKETT: Now, just a minute, your honor,
when they say there are four of them, we would
like to knowMR. BURNS: May I withdray the question, your
honor? I withdraw the last question and will move
forward into a different area.
THE COURT: His answer may stand that they
wanted an attorney, that may stand, that's the substance of what he was going to say, anyway.
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It is apparent from the transcript that there was no
objection to what the witne,,s said. The objection originally
was to any interpretation or conclusions regarding indications given by the defendants, as related by the witness.
The later objection, it is obvious, was to the fact that th'e
statement that they wanted an attorney, was attributed to
the four of them rather than to any particular individual.
Counsel for the defendants was about to say or to require
that the witness stipulate which one indicated drat they
wanted ·an attorney.
MR. PICKETT: Now, just a minute, your honor,
when they say there are four of them, we would like
to knowIn other words, it did not even enter the mind of counsel
for the defendants that there was any objectionable nature
to the statement that they indicated that they wanted an attorney. This is borne ont by the fact that no form.al objection
was preserved so that this issue could be properly heard on
appeal.
Even if counsel at that time had objected, it is only by
a stretch of the imagination that anyone could conceive of
how this could be error. especially prejudicial error. Everyone is well aware of the right of the defendants to defend
themselves at trial and to have counsel appointed for this
purpose. What better indication is there that the defendants
asked for counsel than that the defendants appeared in cour't
with counsel. Should the mere presence of counsel negatively infer that defendants are guilty? Why then should the
protected right to ask for counsel be considered capable of
negatively inferring guilt? It seems quite clear that even
a person who deems himself innocent of the crime charged

would want to be defended by professional counsel and
would so request the court to appoin t one if he were indigent
and had no means to retain counsel for himself. Such request,
although stated into the record, has no negative inference
of guilt. Furthermore, counsel for the respondent, sensing
that the question and the evidence thereby introduced was
in no way valuable to the respondent's case, withdrew the
question and moved into another area.
1

Counsel for the respondent made no comment implying that the indication had any evidenciary import.
All o'f the cases cited by the defendants alluding to the
consthutional status of this rig-ht deal only with the right
against self-incrimination. The state admits that it is errcr,
and in most instances prejudicial error, to imply to the jury
that the accused's refusal to testify is a negative inference
of his guilt. This, however, is not what happened in this
case. FurthP-rmore, the defendants have not found one case
attributing deprivation of constitu'tional rights to due process to the fact that it was casually stated into evidence that
the defendants wanted an attorney after being warned of
their rights.
All of the cases cited by the defendants, alluding to
the constitutional stat'!.ls of this right, deal only with the
right against self-incrimination, and in most of those cases,
counsel for the prosecution specifically, in some manner,
made reference to their remaining silent.
1

POINT II
INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE DEC·
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LARATION OF DEFENDANT WILLIAM GIBSON
McLAUGHLIN WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR AS
TO DENNIS BECKER AND WAS NOT A VIOLATION
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.
Defendants cite the recent case of Bruton v. United
States, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968) as support for their position
that receiving into evidence of an admission made by defendant William G. McLaughlin was error as to Dennis
Becker and denied his right to confrontation. Respondent
submits, however, that the Brnton case does not apply here.
In that case one defendant implicated his co-partner in crime
in a confession given to a postal inspector. The confessions
there were two by the same individual, and were excluded
from evidence as being taken in violation of the recent Miranda case, and the confessor was turned free. His alleged
co-partner, Bruton, however, was convicted upon the evidence admitted, which included the implication from the
confession of his companion in crime. In that case the Supreme Court he'ld that the admitting into evidence of the
confession implica ting the petitioner wa3 unconstitutional
and prejudicial error as it deprived the petitioner of his constitutional right to cross exomination or confrontation. Our
situation is distinguishable from the facts in the Bruton
1

case.
There was no private confession by one of the defendants to a law enforcement officer here. In the instant case
defendant Becker was present when defendant McLaughlin
uttered the admission and remained silent, making no denial
thereof. Defendant Becker's silence thereof should be considered as a silent admission of guilt or tending to be a silent
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admission of guilt. There is no question but what the statement is otherwise admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule. There is more than ample law on that point.
Defendants, however, rai'se the case of Farnsworth v.
State, 14 U.2d 303, 383 P.2d 489 (1963) and say that in that
case, involving similar circumstances (confinement in jail),
the Supreme Court of this state held that the silence of one
defendant, even when present at the time an incriminating
statement was made by the other defendant, the co-partner
in crime could not be used as a silent admission tending
toward his guilt. Defendants attempt to bring the 'facts of
their case within Farnsworth and do so erroneously. In that
case the court set forth several conditions necessary to constitute an admission of guilt by silence and held that only
one condition was not met, namely that the declaration was
one to which an innocent man is the situafion of the defendant would reply. In the Farnsworth case the defendant
had already confessed. Although the statement was made in
the cell it was made in the presence of other prisoners and
not in the presence of a law enforcement officer. The natural
conclusion in that case for defendant to make was tha:t, true
to the silent code of partners in crime, the statement would
never be heard outside tlle inner circles of the suspects
themselves and that the defendant would never be faced
with the problem of answering its implication's. In our case,
defendant McLaughlin had not confessed to the crime
charged. A law enforcement officer was present and more·
over defendant Becker had been the one who had initially
engaged the officer in the conversation requesting that he
read the complaint. The natural thing for him to have done
would have been to deny the complaint, but be that as it may,
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the statement made by McLaughlin was interjected as a
parenthetical or added statement to Becker's conversation
in such a way as to make it appear that it came from
Becker. The natural response here would be to conclude
that from the statement the officer would believe that 'the
defendants had committed the crime, and it seems fairly
logical to conclude that an innocent man in the po'sition of
defendant Becker would have protested the dedar'ati'on by
defendant McLaughlin. The failure o{ defendant Becker
to do so indicates a consciousness of guilt. Respondent submits that it would be difficult indeed to find circumstances
that would be more conducive to such a natural response
than die circumstances in the case at bar.
The least that can be said is defendant Becker was not
denied his right to confrontation. Defendant McLaughlin
was not dismissed and discharged from the case as was the
defendant who confessed in the B,ruton case cited by defendants here. He was available for questioning subject to
the assertion of his right to remain silent under the Fifth
Amendment. He was not, however, put to this test. Defendant Becker never protested this sfatement no,r presented
any other evidence in the trial below.
POINT Ill
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PRE'SERVE
OBJECTIONS AT THE TRIAL COURT PRECLUDES
THE RAl'SING OF THESE ISSUES ON APPEAL.
As before noted, the purpose of defense counsel's objection to the acceptance or stating into the record of the
fact that defendants had asked for an attorney after being
given preinterrogation warnings was not as such objected to

12
at the trial. The objection there for other purposes cannot
form the basis of appeal here to the effect that there has
been a violation of defendants' Fourteenth Amendment
rights to receive warning and instruction of their right to
counsel. Furthermore, such objection as was made was not
preserved in the record for appeal. There was no objection
whatsoever by defense counsel to the admission into evidence of the declaration agains't interest made by McLaughlin in the St. George Jail, either on behalf of McLaughlin
himself or defendant Becker. Therefore, appellants are further precluded from raising on appeal these objections as
error in the pro·ceedings. If such were error, they cannot
now be raised for the first time before this court.
This court has indicated that on occasion it will notice
errors not objected to which are committed at the trial court
level, but that this prerogative will be exercised only "rarely and with caution in an awareness of the importance of
timely and proper objections." State v. Smith, 16 U.2d 374,
401 P.2d 445 (1965).
In the case of State v. Nelson, 12 U.2d 177, 364 P.2d 409
(1961) this court said:
Even the 'absence of an objection this court might
nevertheless take note of and correct and take egregious error. But this could probably be done only
in an unusual case where there was some substantial
error unobjected to by inadvertance or neglect of
counsel and where it was of such critical import
that it appears likely an unjust conviction resulted
therefrom.
Defendant has not alleged incomptency of counsel and
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it is evident from the record that defendants have had a
fair trial. Speaking of this subject in a slightly different
setting, Mr. Chief Justice Crockett on behalf of the court
said:
Upon our survey of this record it appears that the
defendant had what the law entitles him to: a full
and a fair opportunity, with the aid of competent
counsel, to present his case to a jury in the manner
and on the theory he then desired. (The defendants
in this case waived their right to a jury trial and
requested the matter be heard before the trial judge
only.)

It further appears that after the verdict went against
him, an effort has been made by other counsel to
discover some error in the hope of reversal. We
are firmly committed to the proposition that the
rules of law and procedure must be adhered to particularly in a criminal case. But once a fair trial has
been afforded the defendant and a verdict which is
supported by the evidence rendered, the proceedings
are presumed to be valid. We are not disposed to
reverse for some mere technicalities or irregularities
unless they put the defendant at some substantial
disadvantage or had some material bearing on the
fairness of the proceedings or its outcome. Note 5.
State v. Valdez, 19 U.2d 426, 429, 432 P.2d 53, 55
(1967). (Parenthetical added).
The error in this case was not significant or egregious
as required by this court in order to notice on appeal obj ections not raised in the trial court below. Further, as respondent has shown, if the trial court's admission of the contested testimony into evidence was error, it did not prejudice
the defendants in any way since there was oth€r ac~eqi:ate
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evidence upon which to support a finding that the defendants were guilty.
POINT IV
NEITHER THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE
OF THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANTS WANTED
AN ATTORNEY AFTER THEY HAD RECEIVED
THEIR PREINTERROGATION WARNING NOR THE
ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST BY DEFENDANT
McLAUGHLIN AS IT PERTAINS TO DEFENDANT
BECKER WERE ERROR, SINCE A JUDGE SITTING
WITHOUT A JURY IS PRESUMED TO CONSIDER
ONLY THAT EVIDENCE WHICH IS COMPETENT
IN ARRIVING AT HIS DECISION.
Even if it were admitted, which the state does not do,
that the above two points raised by the appellants were
.?rror in the trial court, they could not constitute reversible
error. This is because of the fact that the trial judge understands the law and the rules of evidence and therefore, rather
than being misled by incompetent or erroneously admitted
evidence as would the jury in similar circumstances, it is
presumed that the trial judge in rendering his decision will
disregard that evidence which is incompetent or in error
and rely only upon the competent and proper evidence.
Therefore, if there is other competent evidence which is
sufficient to support the findings and conclusions of the
trial judge, his decision will not be disturbed upon appeal
merely because some incompetent evidence may have been
introduced into record. In re Goldberry's Estate, 95 U. 379,
81 P.2d 1186 (1938); In re Hanson's Estate, 87 U. 580, 52 P.2d
1103 (1935). See also Builder's Steel Co. v. Comm'n. of Internal Revenue, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950). Although the
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cases cited are civil, we deem the underlying policies and
reasons to be the same so that the law would apply also in
criminal cases.
In Pursche v. Atlas Scraper and Engineering Co., 300
F.2d 467, 487-488 (1962), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
said:
Ordinarily the admission of incompetent evidence
over objection wil! not be grounds for reversal
when the case is tried to the court sitting without ·a
jury and there is competent evidence to support the
findings since the presumption is that the judge
disregarded the incompetent evidence and relied
upon the competent evidence.
There is competent evidence to support the judges decision in this case. First, the incident happened very early
in the morning at a t'.me when it was highly unlikely that
anyone else was in the vicinity other than the defendants;
second, although Mr. Nisson was not in a position to distinguish features, there was adequate lighting for him to
distinguish the appearance of defendants in other ways,
such as clothing, build, mannerisms, etc; third, Nisson was
able to observe the rear end of the car used by those committing the crime; and fourth, Mr. Nisson was able to
identify the defendants and the car as being those he had
seen at the scene of the crime within about ten minutes
after the time he first observed them in the act of removing
the phone. When considering the automobile in which the
defendants were riding which was of the color and approximate year and possessed the large round taillights described
by Mr. Nisson and distinctive of a car of that make and
year, also the time of day at which the incident happened
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and at which the defendants were apprehended, the fact
that their car was intercepted nine-tenths of a mile from Mr.
Nisson's store and the phone booth as it entered the freeway by Officer Pfoutz, in addition to the fact that defendant
offered no alibi, made no comment nor offered any evidence
at the trial, and moreover that it was admitted by McLaughlin prior to being taken into custody that he had been in
the phone booth with the flimsy excuse that he had been
there to look for the telephone number of a friend of his
aunts, the totality of thi~ evidence afford more than ample
basis for finding that the defendants were guilty. It was up
to the trial judge sitting in place of the jury at the request
of the defend'ants to weigh 'these facts and make findings
in accordance with these facts, inasmuch as he was present
at the trial and able to observe the testimony of the witnesses
and the demeanor of both the witnesses and the defendants.
Therefore, the conviction below is not subject to reversal
by this court unless it can be determined that all competent
evidence, taken as a whole, is insufficient for reasonable
minds to conclude that the de'fendants were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
It was not error for the judge to allow Officer Pfoutz's
testimony, to 'the effect that the defendants asked for an attorney after they had been given a preinterrogation warning, to remain in the record. Such a request was not a facit
admission of guilt. This statement was 'in no way prejudicial nor considered as evidence against the defendants. This
is p'articularly so where the trial judge, rather than the jury,
heard the entire case and was well aware of the fact that
the defendan'ts had right to counsel and that there
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is no presumption or inference of guilt from such
request, and that such re q u e·s t would be just as
likely to come from one who is inno•cent of the
crime on behalf of his own interest as from one who is
guilty. Neither was it error as to defendant Becker to admit
into evidence the declaration by defendant McLaughlin
that they had not committed the crime maliciously but they
had done it for money. Solicitation of the reading of the
complaint by defendant Becker is such that it would be very
unnatural if an innocent person under the same circumstances did not object to the statement. Also in this instance,
it is presumed that the trial judge, understanding the law
and having many years of experience in determining issues,
instructing juries and ruling on motions involving issues
of evidence and the a<lmissions thereof, would not find the
defendants guilty if there was insufficient other competent
evidence to prevent the raising of a reasonable doubt in his
mind as to their guilt. As a matter of statutory law in this
state the court will recognize and give effect to errors only
if they are prejudicial to the defendants. Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-42-1 (1953). There is more than ample other competent
evidence to sustain the defendants guilt, so that admission,
if error, was not prejudicial. The respondent therefore respectfully prays this court t·o affirm the decision of the
trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Assistant Attorney General
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